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IS DECLARATORY RELIEF
CONSTITUTIONAL?*
CLIFTON WILLIAMSt

Arelief

N IMPENDING contest as to the validity of the declaratory
law in Wisconsin, based upon the argument that such
remedy should be abolished because the federal court holds that
there cannot be a removal, or that there cannot be an original case in
the federal system under declaratory relief, has led the writer to set
forth in this article certain outstanding truths which tend not only to
point out the fallacy of the aforementioned argument, but also to
dispel any further doubt which might arise in the minds of the students
of this question.
Wisconsin has been issuing declaratory relief judgments from an
early date.
This statement, seemingly paradoxical (in view of the date of enactment of the declaratory relief judgments act'), is nevertheless true,
when the various forms in which these innocently, or otherwise, framed
cases are considered, and their effect examined.
In the presentation of these cases, no effort has been made to exhaust
the field, but we will discuss them in the same manner as did the supreme court of Pennsylvania in a case discussed subsequently herein,
to prove- our contention that declaratory relief is nothing new in
Wisconsin.
We will make no effort to go back into the early cases, of which
there are many collected and referred to by the courts in some of
the cases which we will discuss later.
A very interesting case, which was really a declaratory judgment case,
is Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Company v. Bradley, io8 Wis.
467. Imagine a street railway company bringing "an action to restrain
defendants from interfering with plaintiff's business by endeavoring
to ride upon its street cars without paying the fare demanded pursuant
to its lawful regulations, and to judicially establish the validity of
such regulations." The above quotation is taken from the very first
paragraph in the record of the Supreme Court (see page 468) which
* EDrroR's NoTE: The material presented above is an editorial revision of a
brief upon the question of the validity of the declaratory relief law in Wisconsin.
Those divisions not germane to the question at hand were omitted, but the

continuity of the original brief has been preserved.
" Dean of Marquette University Law School.
'Chapter 212, Laws of i927.
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preceded the opinion. The decision of the lower court dissolving the
temporary restraining order was reversed by the supreme court, and
there are many pages of declarations of rights. If this case should
now be brought under the new declaratory relief statutes, would the
opponents of declaratory relief claim that every passenger would have
to be sued?
One of the most important cases in the books holding that there
should be a classification of statutes into classes which would not
violate the constitutional mandate as to uniformity was the case of
Johnson v. City of Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383. Presumably the plaintiff
was a taxpayer, but the case does not say so. The city was anxious
to know if these classified laws were within the then new constitutional
provision which prohibited special legislation to amend city charters.
The court proceeded to declare the statutes valid by affirming the order
sustaining the demurrer to the complaint. The case was a declaratory
relief case in every sense of the word.
One of the early cases holding that a plaintiff may enjoin the
threatened enforcement of an ordinance is Schlitz Brewing Company
v. Superior, 117 Wis. 297. The plaintiff was permitted to go into
equity and get an ordinance into court by alleging "that the defendant
city and its officers threatened to institute proceedings against the plaintiff under said ordinance ..... " As desired, the court proceeded construing the ordinance. The case was clearly Uteclaratory relief because
it saved the plaintiff and others from .the necessity of submitting to
an arrest and raising the question of the validity of the ordinance in
that case. At -that time equity was not supposed to afford a relief if
there was a clear and adequate remedy at law, but the desire to give
declaratory relief apparently outweighed the then existing well known
principle of law and the court proceeded to give the declaratory judgment. It is a peculiar method of reasoning that says a statute would
be void which makes it possible for a court to do what the court has
already decided to do without the existence of the statute.
In Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, the plaintiff, a property owner,
brought an action to restrain officers from enforcing the state tenement
house law which had certain criminal features, and although this lot
was located in the City of Milwaukee, the court went into the application of the law to the entire state, wrote a full declaratory opinion
and held the law void because of several features of the law which
had no application to the plaintiff's property.
In C. Beck Company v. Milwaukee, 139 Wis. 34o, by resorting to
a -temporary restraining order and an appeal from an order dissolving
the temporary injunction, a city ordinance, which punished one for
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the removal of stone or sand from the beach of Milwaukee, was
brought before the supreme court for full declaratory relief.
In Wadhanms Oil Company v. Tracy, 141 Wis. 150, there was an
action brought against the state oil inspeotor who "under pretended
authority of the legislative enactment mentioned, will, unless judicially
prevented, interfere with plaintiff's business to its great pecuniary
and irremediable detriment; that the act violates (here mentions various
sections of the constitution) ; that the inspection fees are exorbitant;
and the act, generally is unreasonable and indefinite. "The court immediately proceeded to construe the statute. Justice Marshall wrote
the opinion and he apparently was conscious of many of the cases
which have been mentioned above, and in speaking of the way that
the validity of the law was brought before the court, says:
The doors of that ultimate resort should swing open freely. But
it will not do to make of the courts, by equitable interference, a
sort of superior upper house to consider and pass, in general, and
particular as well, upon legislative enactments, as the court is requested to do in this case.
Then follow four and one-half pages of construction of the statute.
In the same volume appears the famous opinion entitled In the
M[aher of the Appointment of a Revisor of the Statutes, 141 Wis. 592.
There was no case, no pleadings and no parties, but the court proceeded
to determine the validity, of the statute and the propriety of the expenditures of large sums of money thereunder, and a majority of the
court decided to carry out the provisions of the law. What becomes
of this case when the legislature merely attempts to provide the form
of action which would permit interested parties to ask the court to
do what it did without any pleadings whatever or without any argument
for that matter?
Stdte ex -Iel Buell v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, is a case on the civil
service law. Without any lack of respect to anyone we will state that
a scheme was figured out whereby an original mandamus action was
brought before the supreme court to compel the secretary of state to
order paid a bill for the services of one of the commissioners, although
he was a state officer and there was an appropriation and there was
no reason why he should not be paid. It was generally known at the
bar that the case was rigged up and nobody raised any question but
that it was properly so done. The case is so clearly a declaratory relief and advisory case that it appears on the face of it that the court
handed down an immediate memorandum opinion covering three phases
of the law, which opinion is clearly advisory, and within a month later
the court filed a long opinion covering the various provisions of the
statute.
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Now we come to one of the most farreaching cases in the books.
It is Borgnis v. Falk Company, 147 Wis. 327.

The case changed

the status of thousands of employees, affected hundreds of employers
who were not represented and was the foundation of the institution
of a completely new system of procedure in industrial accidents in
this state, including an expensive administrative body to carry out the
law. A foreman with a salary of $2,ooo a year claimed to have a
contract running a little while in the future and through some theory
-which has never been explained he seems to claim that this contract
had something to do with his injuries which niight occur in the future.
He did not even allege that he thought he might under some possible
circumstance eventually be injured in the future. All he asked was
that the defendant be enjoined from electing to go under the workmen's compensation law. Chief Justice Winslow wrote the opinion,
but so frankly admitted that it was an advisory opinion or declaratory
relief case that he stated this (page 337) :
It seems to be true that this action might very well be disposed
of without considering the question of the validity of the act in
question. Ordinarily under such circumstances that course would
be the proper one to pursue, for the question of the constitutionality of the statute passed by the legislature is not one to be lightly
taken up, and generally such a question will not be decided unless
it be necessary to decide it in order to dispose of the case. [Here
comes the frank admission of declaratory relief.] There are circumstances here present, however, which seem to call very loudly
for immediate consideration of the question of the validity of the
act in question, if under any view of the case it can be considered
as involved.
Then follow many pages of declaratory relief including concurring
opinions by two of the justices. The decision was accepted by the
bench and bar as a complete settlement of the validity of the Industrial
Commission law and as a complete justification for the institution of
the Industrial Commission. Millions of dollars of insurance moneys
in the shape of premiums and compensations have been paid under
this opinion and hundreds of thousands of dollars of expenses of the
'Industrial Commission have been expended. As we have shown, it
was frankly and admittedly a declaratory judgment. And it seems
that it would be much better for our administration of justice to have
such opinions and judgments authorized by the written law, and certainly a written law which merely authorizes what the court has thus
been doing should not be seriously questioned on the ground of constitutionality. This case of Borgnis v. Falk Company, received favorable comment by textbook writers, authors, economists, law journalists
and others throughout the land. On the subject of classification of
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employers under the constitution and the fact that the constitution is
an instrument which must be construed to keep abreast of the times,
Dean Hall in his famous book of Cases of Constitutional Law uses
Borgnis v. Falk Company, on page 363, so that it has been- and is being
used throughout the land in most of the law schools for instruction
purposes among law students.
In the very next volume of the reports we find a case in Milwaukee
County regarding a court room and the continuing expense thereof
determined without pleadings or parties. It was slightly different than
In re Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, in that there was an appeal to the supreme court from an order which had been entered in the circuit
court in the absence of pleadings and parties.2
Immediately following the above case, which is clearly a declaratory opinion, there appear the W'Vater Power Cases, 148 Wis. 124,
which was clearly and frankly another declaratory relief case. The
court does not even say whether it is a mandamus suit, an injunction
suit, or what-not. The simple statement is "a series of suits, as above
indicated, involving the validity of chapter 652, laws of 1911, was
brought in this court against.... [naming various state officials].
When leave to bring these suits was granted, the question of the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the suits was expressly reserved."
The court finally decided, on page 135, that the actions should be
brought as quia timet, while the bar and the bench generally recognized and admitted that the suits were for no other purpose than to
get an expression from the supreme court as to the validity of the
water power statute. Quia timet cases are referred to throughout the
land by courts and authors as one of the best illustrations of declaratory judgment cases, which were tolerated in various places before
various declaratory relief statutes were enacted, which made such
cases slightly more respectable.
In the same volume we have the Income Tax Cases, 148 Wis. 456.
The relator did not complain about his own tax or his possible tax. In
the very first line of the opinion, on page 468, Justice Winslow states
that the actions were brought in equity for the purpose of enjoining
the secretary of state and the tax commission from expending any
money in administering the newly passed income tax law. Under
these circumstances the interests of the relators (there were two or
three cases which were finally combined) would be infinitesimal and
beneath the value of any known coin. This became apparent to the
judge and the fact that there were three or four declaratory relief
opinions in the same volume and handed down practically at the same
'See In re Court Room, 148 Wis. io9.
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term of court must. have also been in his mind because he says (starting on page 477):
If, whenever such a law is passed, it is within the power of any
taxpayer, however paltry his contribution to the public funds, to
come into this court and invoke its original jurisdiction and compel
it to pass upon the validity of the law, it is not difficult to forecast
the result. Every important law will be adverse to the interests
of some taxpayers, and with such a principle established this court
stands in great danger of becoming to all intents and purposes a
third chamber of the legislature, not named in the constitution,
but exercising a veto power over the other houses when invoked
by any taxpayer.
With this reservation the court proceeded to determine the validity
of the statute and handed down a very long and valuable opinion,
which thereafter guided the bench and bar with reference to income
taxes. Apparently, if we should go out and get a taxpayer to enjoin
the commissioner of public works from spending any money to make
a tentative assessment on the Cedar-Biddle widening, none of the defendants in the case at bar would raise any question about the matter
whatever, although tfie interest of the taxpayer could not be calculated
in any known coin. It seems much more respectable to have a statute
authorizing declaratory judgments than to follow in the well-defined
channel of the practice which has grown up as we have seen from
many of the above -cases, and permitting the taxpayer's suit where
the interest of the taxpayer is impossible of calculation because it is
smaller than any known coin unless we resort to Chinese 'brass money.
The writer of this article has always thought that Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, was clearly a declaratory judgment. The parties
were involved in the throes of an ordinary quo warranto action, or
what should have been one, but rather than be required to proceed
along the well defined channels of quo warranto one of the parties was
allowed to step aside and proceed as if in equity. The case is not
so clearly declaratory in that the -plaintiff represented one taxpayer,
or one personally interested in civil service, or one owner of a water
power, but it is declaratory in that the court expressed a willingness
to pass upon the situation without compelling the parties to follow
the well-known lines of procedure.
Cream City Bill Posting Company v. Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 86, is a
plain case of declaratory relief. An examination of the opinion will
not disclose at the beginning what kind of a case it iwas. The court
had so fallen into the habit of writing declaratory judgments that they
did not even mention at the beginning the nature of the action. The
fact is that it was another one of those cases where a corporation
which feared that it might be arrested for the violation of an ordi-
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nance did not wait to raise the question of the validity of the ordinance
in a prosecution case but, following precedent, went into the equity
side of the circuit court and sought an injunction for no other purpose than to get an expression from the court as to the validity of
the ordinance.
We do not wish to be understood as criticizing this practice. It was
then thoroughly legitimate because the court bad in many cases even
before the case of Schlitz Brewing Company v. Superior, 117 Wis.
297, held that the doors of equity were open in this kind of a situation. Violence had been done years before when it was first held
that injunction could be resorted to as a remedy in order to get the
validity of an ordinance passed upon, although the point could be
raised in a prosecution suit. What we mean to say is that a declaratory relief statute, if it had been passed a great many years ago,
would have prevented the original violence to the old and honorable
equity rule that equity will not hear a party who has a relief in law.
In the mind of the author of this brief anyway these cases where
constructions of ordinances and statutes are procured by injunction
are clearly declaratory.
Now comes a case where the complaint is preserved verbatim and
it is not only instructive, it is amusing to read the complaint with the
subsequent declaratory relief statute in mind. We refer to State ex
rel Atwood v. JoJznson, 170 Wis. 218,-the well known soldiers' bonus
case. An effort to keep this article as reasonably short as possible
prevents quotation of the complaint from pages 220 to 226 of that
case, but we cannot refrain from pointing out that the complaint says
that doubt has arisen as to the validity of the act (see page 221). It
is admitted in the complaint, on page 225, that more than fifteen
million dollars are involved. An attempt was made to enforce some
officer from spending a few nickels. The very first lines in the case
are: "This action was originally brought in this court to test the constitutionality of ch. 667, Laws 1919, known as the Soldiers' Bonus Act,
and, if found unconstitutional, to restrain the enforcement of the act."
The prayer for relief (on page 225) is the most frank admission that
we find in the books prior to the passage of the declaratory judgment
act. It reads:
Wherefore plaintiff respectfully prays the judgment of this
court:
i. That the validity of chapter 667, Laws of 1919, be determined and the rights and duties of those charged with its administration be declared; ....

While the plaintiff was a member of the State Tax Commission he
was represented by a private attorney. The other state officers were
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represented by the attorney general. Eminent counsel represented
some soldiers. On the very first page of the opinion proper as distinguished from the record of the case Justice Kerwin says (page
226):

The defendants charged with 'the administration of the law are
entitled to have the question of its validity settled and, if valid, be
advised respecting their rights and duties under it.
Although the plaintiff brought the suit the court had so gotten into
the habit of writing declaratory judgments that Justice Kerwin frankly says that the defendants are entitled to be advised.
Further on in the opinion, (on page 223) Justice Kerwin states and
relies upon an advisory opinion entitled "Opinion of Tustices, 19o Mass.
6 I." Subsequently in this brief we will point out the difference between an advisory opinion and a declaratory opinion.
The declaratory judgments were becoming so common that the city
attorney thought he might as well get one and proceeded to do so in
the case of State ex rel Miller v. Niven, 18o Wis. 583. We had a serious question as to whether or not the minimum wage scale fixed
by the common council of the city or a different one fixed by the
sewerage commission should be inserted in the cohtract. In order
to get the required advice the chairman of the sewerage commission
brought an action in the supreme court to compel the city attorney
to approve the contract which contained the wage scale propounded
by the sewerage commission in place of the one propounded by the
common council. The court satisfied the desires of the parties and
wrote a declaratory judgment authorizing the writ of mandamus
against the city attorney to require him to approve of the contract
which had the sewerage commission's scale of wages in it.
In the case of Wagner v. Milwaukee, i8o Wis. 640, there was a
suit brought against the minimum wage ordinance. The plaintiff said
he was a taxpayer but frankly admitted, and the court points out on
page 641 in the bottom paragraph, that the action is brought "to have
such ordinance declared null-and void and the defendants restrained
from taking any steps to enforce such ordinance or making the same
any part of the contracts to be thereafter let by the City of Milwaukee for public work." Without the slightest effort we can think of
several ways that the validity of this ordinance could have been
raised along well-defined channels. Again the interest of the plaintiff
could only be calculated in Chinese money because it certainly does
not cost very much to insert the provisions of an ordinance in a
contract. The plaintiff did not even allege that the enforcement
of the ordinance would be expensive. He did not even allege that he
had a contract or that he would be threatened with arrest if he did
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have a contract and violated it. The case was clearly a declaratory
judgment case, but it was four years before the declaratory judgment
act was passed. It is interesting to note that the three last above
cases were all in one volume.
Now we come to the Building (Height Cases, 181 Wis. 519. We
challenge any one to determine from the supreme court case and the
opinion the nature of the action. Justice Owen says in the very first
line of the opinion:
These actions are brought to test the validity of ch. 424 of the
Laws of 1923, being sec. 4444f of the Statutes. The law in question is set out in full in the margin. It is claimed that the law is
not a valid exercise of the police power and that it takes private
property without just compensation, contrary to the provisions of
the state and federal constitutions.
One of the cases involved the local telephone company building, but
as a mental exercise an interesting puzzle would be to figure out how
the case can be entitled Klefisch and another v. Wisconsin Telephone
Company.
In the case of State ex rel Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. i8o, the
very first paragraph is as follows (page 181):
Original action of mandamus in this court to compel the defendant Zimmerman, as secretary of state, to audit a voucher for
the payment of $25 to N. B. Dexter for right of way acquired on
a federal-aid project undertaken by virtue of an appropriation of
$i,ooo,ooo made by sec. 2, ch. 30, of the laws of 1925.
It does not seem necessary to say anything more.
We now come to one of the latest declaratory cases in Wisconsin.
It is State ex rel. Ekern v. Milwaukee, 19o Wis. 633. The case was
declaratory in two respects, but it might be well to get the story before the court first. There was a growing sentiment in favor of
allowing the Schroeder Hotel to be built more than 125 feet high. The
city passed a home rule ordinance suspending the operation of a state
law which limited buildings to 125 feet-and passed the cubical content
ordinance which would permit the volume of the building to equal
the result of multiplying the ground area by 125 feet so that air courts
and setbacks could carry up the building indefinitely if the cubical
content did not exceed the result of the multiplication. It was finally
figured out that if the attorney general would step in and question the
right of the city to exercise this bit of governmental power that that
would get the case before the Supreme Court. The scheme worked
and the case came before the Supreme Court and a judicial opinion
was written. Here comes the second declaratory feature. While Mr.
Niven and the writer of this article were closeted considering not

IS DECLARATORY RELIEF CONSTITUTIONAL?

only the advisability but the contents of a motion for re-hearing we
received a telegram from the clerk of the Supreme Court to the effect
that the court on its own motion had set aside the former opinion in
the case and that another opinion was about -to be filed. So the last
case which we will mention in this long string of judicial judgments in
Wisconsin is a double-barreled one. It is just as well that it should
be the last one to be written in Wisconsin because it was just a
short time before the adoption of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act.
The declaratory judgment act will merely purify the practice, in
every respect legalizing a long continued practice in Wisconsin and
will in the future eliminate all "rigging" or "framing" of cases.
Certainly the long continued practice in writing declaratory judgments is a persuasive argument that such a judgment is not unconstitutional. We do not wish to be understood as criticizing the methods
that were used in numerous cases in Wisconsin in securing declaratory judgments. Necessity is always the mother of invention. We
wish we could find milder terms than "rigging up issues" or "framing up cases," but it is a well known fact that even if we could
find a milder term of description, the practice has been going on in
Wisconsin for many many years. Possibly it has become entirely respectable, but certainly it can do no harm to have it now authorized
by the legislature; and to declare the authorization unconstitutional
would indeed be an unfortunate slap at the memory of and the great
work done by such men as Chief Justice Winslow, Justice Marshall,
Justice Timlin, Justice Dodge, Justice Barnes, Justice C. Becker and
many others. It -just happened that while the men named in the
preceding sentence were on the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin, scores and scores of declaratory judgments were written, includirg constructions of the workmen's compensation law, the civil
service act, the primary election law, the income tax law, the tenement house law, soldiers' bonus law, and many, many others.
These declaratory judgments have an ancient and honorable history.
There are many available well written articles which point out the
fact that declaratory judgments have been known in the English system of jurisprudence for hundreds of years. It has occurred to the
writer of this article that one point has not been sufficiently emphasized and that is that declaratory judgments were well known in the
English practice and were part of the English common law when the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Wisconsin
were adopted. There are so many cases holding that the fundamental
principles and the practices of the common law became embedded in
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law by the adoption of these constitutions that it seems unnecessary
to cite a single one. Now if the historians are right and if many
English decisions are right which point out the early history of this
development then the power to write a declaratory judgment was a
part of the judicial power before either one of the said constitutions
were adopted, and then it is inevitably and unavoidably true that the
bestowal of judicial power included the power to write declaratory
judgments and for that reason the constitutionality cannot be questioned.
One of the earliest English declaratory judgments which we have
been able to find was written in 176o.1

A very good recent Canadian case points out the early Canadian
practice.

4

We have had advisory opinions under constitutional provisions in
various states of this country from a very early day as has been
pointed out by various supreme courts, which will be discussed in
another part of this article where declaratory judgment opinions will
be taken up separately. We have had some very early declaratory
judgments in this country. There is a vast difference between advisory
opinions and declaratory judgments and the pointing out of that
difference is the subject of the next heading of this article.
If textbook writers and law authors are right in their contentions
that quieting title cases are an instance of declaratory judgments,
then we have in Wisconsin a very recent case of that kind where the
-,ery first sentence in the opinion reads: "Millions of dollars are involved in the decision herein". 5 The right of the city to fill in about
ninety acres of land in the Milwaukee harbor was. involved. No one
represented the navigators or fishermen and it was not even suggested that the riparian owners on the harbor should be represented.
The case was tried as a plain quieting title suit against the State of
Wisconsin, which had passed the two statutes involved, and the court
proceeded to write a very learned and valuable opinion and has put
at rest the right of the city to go ahead with this mammoth improvement.
Advisory opinions are entirely different when compared with
declaratory judgments.
The very title of most advisory opinion cases shows that they are
not law suits. There have been more advisory opinions written in
Massachusetts and Nebraska than in any other two states. An advisory
opinion in Massachusetts is ordinarily called "Opinion of the justices"
'See Certificate of Judges, 2 Eden, 371.
'See it re Sundy Legislation, 35 Can. S.C. 581.
Milwaukee v. the State, 193 Wis. 423.
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and is then followed by the volume and page.6 In Nebraska the subject generally reads "In re" something.Ordinarily the duty and obligation of rendering an advisory opinion
is bestowed upon the court by clause in the state constitution. In some
states the clause requires the opinion to be given to the legislature,
and in some to the governor, and in some to either the governor or the
legislature; for instance, in Massachusetts, Section 3, Article 2, of the
constitution requires the Supereme Court to give opinions to the legislature. The court has held, of course, that the opinion must be upon
a pending imatter."
In Maine, Section 3, Article 6, of the constitution requires the
court to give the opinions to the governor. 9
The court has, however, held that the request in the opinion should
be limited to some important question of law.'10
In Missouri the old constitution, in Section ii of Article 6, required
the opinion to be given either to the governor or the legislature on
important questions of constitutional law." A little research, however, reveals that the new constitution of Missouri has dropped this
clause.
In Florida, Section 13 of Article 4 of the Constitution authorizes
the governor to ask the Supreme Court for opinions. 2
Colorado had a well defined practice although the court had been
quite reluctant in many cases. Section 3 of Article 6 of the constitution required the court to give advisory opinions to the legislature.
One of the late cases is the opinion in 79 Pac. Ioo9. Colorado was
3
one of the first states to adopt the uniform declaratory relief act.'
In Rhode Island, Section 3 of Article IO of the constitution requires
the opinions to be given to the legislature. 14
In South Dakota, Section 13 of Article 5 of the constitution gives
the governor the power to ask the supreme court for advisory
See: Opinion of J$stices, 208 Mass. 614; Atswer of Justices, 15o Mass. 598.
"See: In re State Warrants, 25 Neb. 659; In re School Fund, 15 Neb. 684;
In re Railroad Commission, 15 Neb. 679; In re Senate File No. 31, 25 Neb. 864.
'See: Opinion of Justices, 19o Mass. 611.
'See: In re Opinion of Justices, 85 Me. 545; 27 At. 454.
"See: 95 Me. 564; 51 AtI. 224.
a' See: In re Northern Missouri Railway, 5, Mo. 586; In re Opinimo of the
Court, 55 Mo. 497; In re Opinion of the Court, 58 Mo. 369.
See: In re Executive Comnmunication, 23 Fla. 297; 6 S. 925.

"See: Chapter 98, Laws of 1923.
" See: In re Legislative Adjourntent, 18 R.I. 824;
716.

27

Atl. 324;

22

L. R. A.
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opinions.' 5 South Dakota adopted the uniform declaratory judgment
act in 1925.16
Kentucky has been rendering both advisory opinions and declaratory
judgments for several years, but Kentucky is not classed as one of the
17
states that have adopted the uniform declaratory judgment act.
The constitution of New Hampshire has from an early date authorized advisory opinions. There have been many opinions written
in that state. Sometimes they are entitled "Opinions of the Justices."' 18
While it will be found that there is a different title as follows: "In
re School-Law Manual, 63 N.H. 574, 4 Atl. 878," there is a very comprehensive historical discussion of this proposition of advisory opinions in 15 C. J. under "courts" section 78, page 785.
We seem to have two advisory opinions in Wisconsin, or at least
two opinions which partake of all the characteristics of advisory
opinions although we have no provision in the constitution and we
have no statute authorizing the procedure.
In re Appointment of Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, has all of the characteristics of an advisory opinion in that there were no parties and no
pleadings and no argument.
In -'e Court Room, 148 Wis. lO9, has some of the characteristics
of an advisory opinion in that there were no pleadings and no parties,
but it has one characteristic of declaratory judgment acts in that there
was an appeal from an order, which Judge Turner dictated and filed
in the lower court with respect to his court room. By turning to page
IIO and subsequent pages of the opinion, the informality of the court
order in the circuit court will be immediately apparent. The so-called
court order includes correspondence between the judge and the owners of the building and between the judge and a committee of the
county board and then the judge "ordered" that the court room to
which the county board proposed to have him moved was not suitable;
and then it was further ordered that until the further order of his
branch of the court, his court room would be established on the fourth
floor of the Masonic Building. There was an appeal from that socalled order and an opinion written. As just stated, it partakes somewhat of an advisory opinion and somewhat of a declaratory relief.
I

See: In re Construction of constitution, 3 S.D. 548; 54 N.W. 650; 19 L. R. A.

575.
"See: Chapter 214, Laws of 1925.

" See: In re Sinking Fund, 32 S.D. 414, for an advisory opinion; and one of
the latest declaratory relief cases is Charette v. St. Mathew Bank, 214 Ky. 2oo;
283 S.W. 410; 5o A.L.R. 34.

'See: Opinlom of the Justices: 56 N.H. 574; 62 N.H.
43 Atl. 1074; 73 N.H. 625; 63 Atl. 5o5.

704;

67 N.H. 600;
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The opponents of declaratory judgments very readily and almost
willfully confuse the subject with advisory opinions, but there is no
basis for the confusion and they should be kept separate in the mind
of any one who is investigating either subject. It is very easy to
say that an advisory opinion is -non-judicial, but only one court of
this land has said that- a declaratory judgment is non-judicial. The
notes in 12 A. L. R. 52, which is at the end of that Michigan case
show that the decision was without support when written and a collection of cases subsequently made herein will demonstrate that the case
has never been folloxved.
Only one American court (Michigan) has held a declaratory
judgment act unconstitutional, and within the same year other
courts began refusing to follow the opinion and the dissent by
states is now uniform.
The Michigan case has been so thoroughly discredited by law authors and other supreme courts that it does not seem necessary here to
say very much about it.19 To the casual observer two weaknesses are
apparent which are repeatedly pointed out by courts and authors.
First, the facts in the case were very weak. Second, the Michigan
court lost sight of the basic difference between Federal Government
and the state government. The Michigan court quotes at length from
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, wherein it is pointed out

that the United States Government is a government of delegated power
and that the power of the court must be found in the constitution or
it cannot be found at all. It is also pointed out that the Federal Supreme Court is a court of delegated power because it was created
by the constitution, which was in turn created by the thirteen original
states and clearly then the Federal Supreme Court has no inherent
powers, and for any matter to be determined-in the Federal Supreme
Court it must be a case where a controversy exists within the language
of the Federal Constitution. Speaking of the Muskrat decision, the
Michigan court says:
This case should forever put at rest this question. It is absolutely decisive of the question before us.
Immediately other courts and law authors began to show the false
premises in this last quotation with a result that not. a single court
has followed the opinion, at least eleven have critici-ed it and refused
to follow it and law authors generally have pointed out the error.
Within the same year Kansas refused to follow the Michigan case
and we believe that Kansas was the first state to refuse. Then came
California, then Tennessee, then Pennsylvania, then Virginia, then
Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway Co., 179 N.W. 350,

12

A.L.R.

52.
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Kentucky, then Connecticut, followed by New York and so forth.
These decisions will be treated of later herein.
On page 84 of the Pacific Report of the Kansas case the court very
carefully points out the difference between declaratory judgments and
advisory opinions, stating "A mere advisory opinion upon an abstract
question is obviously not a judgment at all, since there are no parties
to be bound, and the rights of no one are directly affected." 2" The
court then takes up declaratory judgments, mentions the old actions to
quiet title, and various other cases in which declaratory relief has in
fact been given since the early days, and then says:
Why the Legislature cannot authorize similar procedure in like
situations to meet like needs is not apparent.
In the California case above referred to, the court positively repulsed the Michigan decision by stating:
Much that is said by the Michigan court is satisfactorily anwered
by the decisions in Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129;
Title Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289; 88 Pac. 356; and
Hoffman v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 386; 90 Pac. 939. It there-

fore seems2 1 unnecessary for us to further consider the decision of
that court.

It will be found in this decision that the California statute is not the
uniform declaratory relief act, but has most of the important provisions thereof. In fact, California adopted its statute before the uniform law commissioners were quite ready to report the result of their
labors.
In Tennessee we have possibly the first case in the books which held
the uniform declaratory judgment act to be constitutional.2

2

It is

noticed above that both Kansas and California had refused to follow
the Michigan case and had held declaratory judgment statutes to be
valid, but neither one happened to be the uniform act. The Tennessee court refused the Michigan case in detail and refused to follow it
and this is one of the cases which also points out how the Michigan
court was misled by not observing the basic distinction between the
Federal Government and the state governments. After pointing out
the distinction the Tennessee court said:
Therefore we do not think that the case of Muskrat v. United
States, and the other federal decisions-cited in the majority opinion
in the Anway Case, are controlling in the instant cause.
Without further elaboration, we are of the opinion that this act
under consideration does not violate any provision of our Constitution, and is therefore a valid statute.
'State ex rel Hopkins v. Grove, 2O9 Kans. 619; 2oi Pac. 82;
'Blakeslee v. Wilson, i9o Cal. 479, 213 Pac. 495.
'Miller v. Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S.W. 965.
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The declaratory relief statute again came before the Tennessee court
in a later case, and while the court pointed out in this case that the
declaratory judgments act was not a cure-all, it used the following
sentence:
This court is committed to a liberal interpretation of the Declaratory Judgments Act so 23
as to make it of real service to the
people and to the profession.
Subsequently the Tennessee court was asked to pass upon the validity and constitutionality of the statute, and the case answers some of
the very contentions that are made by some of our opponents, who
claim -that seeking a declaratory judgment upon the validity of the
statute is merely asking an advisory opinion from the supreme court.24
The attorney general made that very contention in the Tennessee case
now under discussion and the court said that since there were parties
before the court on opposite sides of the question, some contending
that the statute in question was invalid and others pointing out that it
was valid, that the court would be obligated to write a declaratory
judgment, which it proceeded to do.
The Tennessee court was again called upon to render a declaratory
judgment as to the validity of a recent statute of Tennessee governing
the operation of pool and billiard rooms. 25 The court points out that

the parties are interested in the question of the constitutionality of
this statute, and then says:
We are of the opinion that a person so situated is entitled to
bring and maintain an action for the determination of the proper
construction or constitutionality of such a statute, under the provisions of the Declaratory judgments Law, and the bill in the present cause was properly filed against the sheriff, in view of the
averment of the bill that the sheriff had given notice of his intention to proceed against complainants.
The court next proceeded to find the statute under investigation to
be unconstitutional and entered a declaration of the rights and status
of the parties as the declaratory judgment law required. Here again
is an emphatic answer to the question that the validity of the statute
cannot be determined tinder declaratory judgment procedure.
In a later Tennessee case the parties were ahxious to know whether
or not a statute of 1927 passed by the"Tennessee Legislature had repealed another act of 19o7. 2 6 The complainants' appeal merely asked
for a declaration of the law as to that one question. Here is the final
determination of the case:
Hodges v. Hamblen, 277 S.W. 9O1.
" Goetz v. Sith, 278 S.W. 417.
S'Erwin Billiard Parlorv. Buckner, 3oo S.W. 656.
'Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, I S.W. Rep. 2nd Series.
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A decree will accordingly be entered in this court adjudging
that the Acts of 1907, (C.149), is not repealed by the subsequent
enactment of the Acts of 1927, (C.457).

What a sensible procedure that is. It obviates the necessity of expensive litigation in order to finally get into the supreme court after
extensive effort to find out whether or not it has been done under the
wrong law.
Now we come to the previously mentioned Pennsylvania case, which
is one of the best reasoned cases in the books. 27 The decision is
written by Chief Justice Moschzisker, one of the clearest thinkers
on an American Bench today. On page 267 of the Atlantic Reporter he refers to the article written by Professor Borchard in 28
Yale Law Journal, 1-32. He points out that Pennsylvania has been
writing declaratory judgments for years in one form or another. Then
he takes up the Michigan case and we have nothing to add to what
he does to that Michigan case. He not only very pointedly says that
the Michigan court was mistaken, but he also says:
But this decision has not been followed in any other state, as
far as we are aware.
On the question of the constitutionality of the new uniform act,
which had been up before him he says:
In our opinion, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is
a constitutional piece of 2 8legislation, which, within proper limits,
can be made of real use.
The supreme court of Virginia made the following finding when
asked to pass upon the 1922 statute of that state authorizing declaratory judgments:
Its effect is to increase the usefulness of the courts and remove
doubt and uncertainty as to the final result of legal controversies,
by empowering the courts to enter declaratory judgments and
decrees touching the rights of the parties in such cases. 9
An interesting history is related on page 219 showing the first English statute to be in 185o and that the law then spread to Australia and
Canada. The court points out several states where the procedure has
been adopted, including Hawaii, which is the only one we have been
unable to find. And then the court says:
The constitutionality of these statutes has been considered by
the courts of several states, and sustained in each instance except
in Michigan.
Immediately thereafter the court refuses to follow the Michigan
case.
'Petition of Kariher, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atd. 265.
mI131 Atv. 271.
2'Patterson v. Pattersonr, 131 S.E. 217.
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In a New York case (1922) the Supreme Court of that state was
asked for a declaratory judgment, defining the limitations upon the
amount of a. tax to be raised.30 The court proceeded to render a declaratory judgment and said:
The constitutionality of such a proceeding as this one for a
declaratory judgment, where an actual controversy exists involving
only a question of law, and 'the power of the Supreme Court to
authorize such a procedure in such a case is not open to question.
Many authorities are cited in support of this statement.
Another New York declaratory judgment case worthy of consideration is one which arose under some New York statutes precipitating this statement by the court:
It would be difficult to find a more appropriate case for the
application of the law permitting declaratory judgments. We are
told that important public interests are involved, the speedy determination of which is imperative. It is therefore necessary that
the. respective rights of the parties be determined without delay.
Their determination will probably promote the public welfare and
render possible the performance of acts necessary
for the advance3
ment of the business interests of the city. '
Two judges dissented, but they said they concurred in the conclusion reached by the court that it was a proper controversy for the
rendering of a declaratory judgment.
Connecticut, likewise has been called upon to consider the validity
of its declaratory judgments act, which was passed in 1921, prior to
the recommendation of the uniform act by the commissioners. 2 The
Connecticut act bears many of the features of the uniform act. The
court points out that there is no distinction between declaratory judgment and any other judgment entered in- a proceeding like quieting
title or some such proceeding. The court then holds that the refusal
of the declaratory judgment would be a restriction upon judicial powers' because such judicial power has been exercised from an early
day. The court says that the method of procedure may be novel, but
that it is nothing but an enlargement of the method of procedure and
is clearly within the judicial power. The court says that they have
examined the recent Michigan case, but it has not changed the opinions
which they expressed in an earlier Connecticut case entitled Dawson v.
Orange, 78 Conn. 96, 61 At. ioi.
In declaring the uniform act constitutional, the New Jersey Supreme
Board of Education of the City of Rochester v. Van Zandt, 195 N.Y.S. 297.
Comptroller v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 203 N.Y.S. 236.
'Braman v. Babcock, 98 Conn. 549, 12o AtI. 15o.
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Court pointed out that an earlier statute had been passed in 1873, and
33

its validity determined previously.

The court said:
Declaratory judgment statutes similar to, if not identical with,
that now under consideration have been enacted by the Legislature
of many of our sister states, and have been the subject of much
discussion by the courts of several of those states in considering
the question whether challenges to the validity of such legislation,
similar in essence to that interposed by counsel for the defendant,
rest upon a sound legal basis. The great majority of those courts
have held that the powers conferred upon judicial tribunals by
these statutes, an dthe duties imposed upon them in the exercise of
those powers, were not violative of constitutional principles.
[Citing several authorities.] 34
The court finally says:
Our conclusion is that the attack upon the constitutionality of
this statute is without legal basis.
There is another Pennsylvania case that might be well to consider
for just a moment. 35 The opinion was also written by Chief Justice
Moschzisker.
There was a fine application of the declaratory judgment law to an
involved lease controversy and the Chief Justice says:
In a case like the present, by proceeding according to the Declaratory Judgments Act, the parties avoid the necessity of first
actually erecting a building in order to be in a position to obtain a
judicial construction of their respective rights and liabilities .....
A prime purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act is to render
"practical help" in ending controversies such as the one-now before
US.
The declaratory judgment entered in the lower court was affirmed.
We now have declaratory judgments acts in twenty-three states
including Wisconsin.
In the opening paragraph of his very learned, article in the American Bar Association Journal for December, 1928, Professor Borchdrd,
of Yale University, states that twenty-three states now have adopted
the declaratory judgment procedure. There might be an inference
from the language used that all of these states have adopted the uniform law. To that extent the statement is not quite clear. Twelve
of the states have adopted the uniform act wibhout change and in
some of the other states we find somewhatt similar acts, but in some
36
instances considerably older.
In re Public Utility Board, 83 N.J. Law, 303; 84 Atl. 706.
'McCrory Stores Corporation v. S. M. Braunstein, Inc., 102 N.J. 590, 134
Atl. 752.
' Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., 291 Pac. 507; 14o Atl. 5o6.
' The. following states, arranged alphabetically, have adopted the uniform act:
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There is a vast difference between the Federal Government and
the State Governments.
Possibly the clearest statement by the Supreme Court of the United
States is in the famous case of United States v. Cruickshank, 92 U. S.
542, 549-551,

23

L. Ed. 588.

Mr. Chief Justice White very clearly

says:
The government of the United States is one of delegated powers
alone. Its authority is defined and limited by the Constitution.
All powers not granted to it by that instrument are reserved to
the states or the people. No rights can be acquired under the Constitution or laws of the United States, except such as the government of the United States has the authority to grant or secure. All
that cannot be so granted or secured are left under the protection
of the states.
Another very famous case where this distinction is pointed out is
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. There after a
struggle the court construed out of the Constitution as written, the authority to incorporate a federal bank by considering it one of the expressed powers to coin money, collect taxes, borrow money, regulate
commerce, and so forth.
In short, when we are examining a federal question we must look
for delegated power in the Federal Government and we must find it
expressed in the Constitution or necessarily implied, in order to carry
out a power which is clearly mentioned in the Constitution. When
examining a state proposition where the government is one of inherent
sovereignty, we must look only for limitations or prohibitions. In
other words, a federal uniform declaratory judgment act may not be
valid because the Constitution bestows no such power upon Congress,
as was pointed out in the Muskrat case, while in a state the act is valid
unless there is some prohibition in the state constitution prohibiting
the legislature from thus changing the form of Civil Procedure before the courts.
Our legislature has full power to regulate forms of actions.
Arizona, Chapter IO, Laws of 1927; Colorado, Chapter 98, Laws of 1923; Indiana,
Chapter 81, Laws of 1927; New Jersey, Chapter 14o, Laws of 1924; North
Dakota, Chapter 237, Laws of 1923; Oregon, Chapter 3o0, Laws of I927; Pennsylvania, Chapter 321, Laws of 1923; South Dakota, Chapter 214, Laws of 1925;
Tennessee, Chapter 29, Laws of 1923; Utah, Chapter 24, Laws of 1925; Wisconsin, Chapter 212, Laws of 1927; Wyoming, Chapter 50, Laws of 1923.

The following states, according to our investigation, cannot be said to have the
uniform act, although they do have complete acts authorizing declaratory judgments. Rhode Island, Acts of 1876, Chapter 563 Sec. 17; Florida, Laws of
1919, Chapter 148; Kansas, Laws of I92i, Chapter 168; California, Laws of 1921'
Chapter 689 Sec. io6o C, page 1923; Kentucky, Laws of 1922, Chapter 235; Vir1922, Chapter 9o2; South Carolina, Laws of 192, Chapter 967.

ginia, Laws of
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The present law authorizing declaratory judgments is not nearly
as abrupt a change in the form of court procedure as was the adoption of the original code in 1856. Just imagine how the new Code
sounded to the old common law and equity pleaders when it said this:
Sec. 260.08 (formerly sec. 2600 of the Code). The distinction
between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all
such actions and suits, have been abolished, and there is in this
state but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of
private rights and the redress or prevention of private wrongs,
which is denominated a civil action.
If the courts have all the judicial power which the opponents of
declaratory relief claim, why did not the courts refuse to abide by
that provision?
Why then do the courts permit a man to have a second trial in
an ejectment suit?
If judicial power is so beyond regulation by the legislative branch
of the government, why do not our courts put divorce judgments immediately into effect? Why do the judges call the parties up and
instruct them that the judgment is not to be good for a year? We
could go through the various instances in our practice, acts, and Code
of Procedure, where the legislature has rendered the forms of actions
and described the form of procedure, even telling the judge what he
may do and what he may not do. For instance, why does not the
Supreme Court allow an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer
forty days after it was rendered in the lower court, if judicial power
is what the opponents seem to think it is? It must be admitted by
all that judicial power is the power to determine, but that the method
of arriving at the determination is clearly within the hands of the
legislature. Surely the uniform declaratory judgments act is mild
when compared with many of the statutory regulations of court procedure and many of the changes that have been brought about from
time to time by various statutes.

